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Michael	Wheeler	
		
1.	Andy	Clark	–	He’s	One	of	our	Own	
	
According	to	the	hypothesis	of	extended	cognition	(henceforth	ExC),	the	physical	machinery	
of	mind	sometimes	extends	beyond	the	skull	and	skin.	More	precisely,	there	are	actual	(in	
this	world)	cases	of	intelligent	thought	and	action,	in	which	the	material	vehicles	that	realize	
the	thinking	and	thoughts	concerned	are	spatially	distributed	over	brain,	body	and	world,	in	
such	a	way	that	certain	external	(beyond-the-skin)	elements	(paradigmatically,	technological	
devices)	are	rightly	accorded	fundamentally	the	same	status	(i.e.,	cognitive	status)	as	would	
ordinarily	be	accorded	to	a	subset	of	your	neurons.	So,	if	ExC	is	true,	then	sometimes	your	
mobile	phone	isn’t	just	an	external	information	storage	device	that	saves	your	poor	old	
brain	the	trouble	of	storing	all	those	phone	numbers	(although	it	is	that),	it	is	also	literally	
part	of	your	memory,	and	thus	part	of	your	mind,	in	the	sense	that	it’s	part	of	your	
mnemonic	machinery.	
	
ExC	was	given	its	ceremonial	launch	in	a	now-famous	co-authored	paper	by	Andy	Clark	and	
David	Chalmers	(1998),	although	it	was	Clark	who	really	ran	with	the	idea	afterwards	(see	
especially	Clark	2008),	and	it	is	Clark	who	has	done	more	than	anyone	to	amplify,	clarify	and	
promote	the	view.1	Over	the	years,	ExC	has	generated	a	lively	debate	between	its	advocates	
and	its	gainsayers	(see	e.g.	the	developments,	defences	and	critiques	collected	in	Menary	
2010),	with	the	advocates	of	extended	cognition	dividing	into	several	factions,	each	with	its	
own	favoured	ways	of	expressing	and	arguing	for	the	extension	claim.	Arguably	the	most	
prominent	of	these	pro-ExC	groups	are	the	two	that	Sutton	(2010)	has	helpfully	dubbed	the	
first	wave	and	the	second	wave	of	ExC	theorists.	There	are	also	third-wave	(Kirchhoff	2012)	
																																																						
1	Readers	who	are	familiar	with	the	original	Clark	and	Chalmers	treatment	might	worry	that	my	
opening	paragraph	mischaracterizes	the	position	on	offer,	by	riding	roughshod	over	a	distinction	
between	cognition	and	mind	that	plays	an	organizing	role	in	that	treatment.	After	all	(someone	
might	complain),	Clark	and	Chalmers	first	argue	for	extended	cognition	and	then,	additionally,	for	
the	extended	mind,	so	glossing	extended	cognition	as	a	view	about	the	physical	machinery	of	mind	
cannot	reflect	their	conception	of	ExC.	However,	Clark	and	Chalmers	(1998,	12)	actually	draw	a	
distinction	between	cognitive	processing	(with	the	emphasis	explicitly	on	the	word	‘processing’)	and	
on	‘truly	mental	states’	such	as	‘experiences,	beliefs,	desires	[and]	emotions’.	There	are,	in	fact,	
many	distinctions	that	might	be	in	play	here	–	including	at	least	those	between	processes	and	states,	
the	non-conscious	and	the	conscious,	the	affective	and	(a	narrow	notion	of)	the	cognitive,	and	the	
non-doxastic	and	the	doxastic.	Any	attempt	to	regiment	these	different	distinctions	so	as	to	fix	a	
global	distinction	between	cognition	and	mind	looks	to	be	(at	best)	artificially	stipulative.	Suffice	to	
say	(i)	that	Clark	typically	abandons	the	distinction	between	cognition	and	mind	in	later	discussions	
of	ExC,	and	(ii)	that	treating	‘mind’	and	‘cognition’	as	interchangeable	terms	that	pick	out	the	same	
group	of	states	and	processes	–	the	psychological	ones	–	is	standard	practice	in	cognitive	science.						
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and	fourth-wave	(Fritzman	and	Thornburg	2016)	versions	of	the	view,	but,	as	I	interpret	
them	anyway,	these	positions	don’t	have	the	same	intimate	relationship	with	Clark’s	own	
work	that	I	shall	be	exploring	here.				
	
First-wave	ExC	is	standardly	characterized	(by	Sutton	among	others)	as	emphasizing	and	
defending	the	kinds	of	arguments	for	extended	cognition	that	were	to	the	fore	in	the	
original	Clark	and	Chalmers	paper.	Almost	all	of	the	attention	here	is	concentrated	on	the	
so-called	parity	principle.	Clark’s	more	recent	formulation	of	this	principle	is	as	follows:	‘[i]f,	
as	we	confront	some	task,	a	part	of	the	world	functions	as	a	process	which,	were	it	to	go	on	
in	the	head,	we	would	have	no	hesitation	in	accepting	as	part	of	the	cognitive	process,	then	
that	part	of	the	world	is	(for	that	time)	part	of	the	cognitive	process’	(Clark	2008,	77,	
drawing	on	Clark	and	Chalmers	1998,	8).	As	has	been	repeatedly	pointed	out	(e.g.	by	
Menary	2007;	by	Wheeler	2011a,	b;	and	by	Clark	himself	–	Clark	2008),	the	parity	principle	
has	sometimes	been	misunderstood	in	the	literature,	so	let’s	tread	carefully.	The	parity	
principle	asks	us	to	start	by	considering	a	distributed	(over	brain,	body	and	world)	system,	
one	that	generates	some	psychologically	interesting	outcome	in	such	a	way	that	an	
important	functional	contribution	(such	as	information	storage	or	information	processing)	is	
made	by	certain	beyond-the-skin	elements.	We	are	then	encouraged	to	imagine	a	
hypothetical,	functionally	equivalent,	but	wholly	inner	system.	In	this	second	system,	the	
specific	functional	contribution	that	is	made	in	the	distributed	case	by	the	previously	
identified	external	element	is	made	by	an	internal	one.	Having	taken	this	imaginative	step,	if	
we	then	judge	that	the	internal	element	in	the	latter,	hypothetical	case	counts	as	a	genuine	
part	of	that	agent’s	mental	machinery,	then	we	ought	to	conclude	that	the	very	same	status	
–	that	is,	cognitive	status	–	should	be	granted	to	the	highlighted	external	element	in	the	
environment-involving	case	with	which	we	began.	To	do	otherwise	would	be	to	succumb	to	
neural	chauvinism,	which	is	tantamount	to	begging	the	question	against	ExC.		
	
Let’s	follow	Sutton	in	taking	adherence	to	the	parity	principle	to	be	the	mark	of	first-wave	
ExC.	By	contrast,	second-wave	ExC	theorists	reject,	or	at	least	downplay	significantly,	the	
parity	principle,	in	favour	of	considerations	of	either	complementarity	(Sutton	2010,	
Kiverstein	and	Farina	2011)	or,	in	a	closely	related	vein,	cognitive	integration	(Rowlands	
1999,	Menary	2007).	According	to	second-wave	ExC,	functional	equivalence	between	outer	
and	inner	elements,	as	expressed	in	terms	of	the	parity	principle,	is	not	necessary	for	
extended	cognition,	so	focussing	on	that	notion	may	in	fact	mislead	us	as	to	the	most	
important,	exciting	and	illuminating	features	of	extended	cognitive	systems.	Put	crudely,	it’s	
difference	not	sameness	that	matters.	Sutton	(2010,	194)	expresses	these	points	as	follows:	
‘in	extended	cognitive	systems,	external	states	and	processes	need	not	mimic	or	replicate	
the	formats,	dynamics,	or	functions	of	inner	states	and	processes’,	so	‘different	components	
of	the	overall	(enduring	or	temporary)	system	can	play	quite	different	roles	and	have	
different	properties	while	coupling	in	collective	and	complementary	contributions	to	flexible	
thinking	and	acting’.	Adding	a	further	dimension	to,	or	perhaps	making	explicit	an	existing	
dimension	of,	complementarity,	the	integrationists	emphasize	the	processes	by	which	
internal	and	external	elements	with	different	properties	may	be	combined	into	a	single	(and	
thus	integrated)	cognitive	whole.	Thus	while	maintaining	the	second-wave	emphasis	on	the	
importance	of	functional	differences	and	complementarity,	integrationists	also	foreground	
factors	such	as	the	completion	of	cognitive	tasks	through	the	skilled	manipulation	of	
external	elements	(especially	cases	in	which	the	task	couldn’t	be	completed	without	the	
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external	elements	in	question),	the	transformation	of	our	cognitive	abilities	through	the	
learning	of	such	manipulative	skills,	and	the	application	of	norms	of	manipulation	with	a	
distinctively	cognitive	character	(Menary	2007).	Henceforth,	and	with	apologies	to	any	
integrationists	who	are	irritated	by	the	move,	I	shall	use	complementarity	in	a	way	that	is	
meant	to	subsume	integration.				
	
On	the	face	of	things,	it	looks	as	though	even	if	first-wave	and	second-wave	ExC	aren’t	
formally	inconsistent	(more	on	this	as	we	go	along),	the	two	groups	of	theorists	must	at	
least	disagree	about	the	best	way	to	argue	for	ExC.	As	Menary	(2007,	57)	puts	it,	a	‘major	
difference	between	[first-wave]	extended	mind	style	arguments	and	[second-wave]	
cognitive	integration	is	that	the	latter	does	not	depend	upon	the	parity	principle’.	And	
Sutton	(2010,	205)	interprets	the	parity	principle	as,	at	best,	‘a	temporary	indicator	of	
cognitive	extension,	a	place-holder	for	fuller,	more	inclusive	sciences	of	the	interface’.	But	
now	here’s	an	intriguing	fact.	First-wave	theorists	claim	Clark	as	one	of	their	own	(he	was,	
after	all,	one	of	the	architects	of	the	parity	principle),	but	so	too	do	second-wave	theorists	
(see	e.g.	Sutton,	2010,	205,	who	focusses	on	a	piece	by	Clark	that	I	shall	discuss	in	the	next	
section,	and	Menary	2007,	57).	If	these	attributions	are	all	correct,	Clark	is	simultaneously	a	
first-wave	(parity-based)	and	a	second-wave	(complementarity-based)	theorist.	But	if	the	
tension	between	first-wave	and	second-wave	ExC	is	genuine,	this	position	is,	at	best,	an	
uncomfortable	one	for	Clark	to	occupy.	The	goal	of	the	rest	of	this	paper	is	to	explore	this	
apparent	discomfort.		
	
2.	Walking	Both	Sides	of	the	Street	
	
During	an	illuminating	reply	to	some	commentators,	Clark	(1998)	considers	an	early	
challenge	to	(what	we	now	know	as)	first-wave	ExC,	a	challenge	mounted	by	O’Brien	(1998).	
O’Brien	focusses	on	a	specific	example	of	external	information	storage	that	Clark	and	
Chalmers	(1998)	judge,	largely	by	appeal	to	parity	considerations,	to	be	part	of	an	extended	
cognitive	system,	namely	the	linguistic	inscriptions	in	a	reliably	and	uncritically	accessed	
notebook.	These	external	elements	allegedly	store	the	content	of	one	of	the	agent’s	
dispositional	beliefs.	For	present	purposes,	the	only	thing	that	matters	about	this	example	
(which	many	readers	will	recognize	immediately	as	the	contested	case	of	Otto)	is	the	form	
of	information	storage	instantiated	by	the	notebook.	Roughly,	O’Brien	complains	that,	if	we	
take	the	notebook	as	a	good	example	of	external	information	storage,	and	if	we	take	
connectionist	networks	as	our	best	model	for	inner	(neural)	psychological	information	
storage,	then	we	are	forced	to	conclude	that	internal	and	external	elements	store	and	
organise	information	in	very	different	ways,	since	the	linguistic	inscriptions	in	the	notebook	
are	akin	to	a	classical	database	and	so	will	fail	to	ground	capacities	such	as	fluid	
generalization,	default	reasoning	and	graceful	degradation	that	we	associate	with	
connectionist	forms	of	representation.	As	a	result,	functional	equivalence	(parity)	fails,	and,	
along	with	it,	the	first-wave	case	for	ExC.			
	
Clark	could	have	responded	to	O’Brien’s	objection	by	pointing	out	that	it	trades	on	a	
misreading	of	the	parity	principle.	As	mentioned	earlier,	according	to	that	principle,	we	
should	start	with	the	distributed,	notebook-deploying	system,	and	then	imagine	a	
functionally	equivalent	element	to	the	notebook	operating	inside	the	head	of	an	agent,	as	
part	of	a	wholly	inner	system.	As	far	as	the	parity	principle	is	concerned,	then,	the	
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requirement	is	not	that	the	mode	of	information	storage	under	the	spotlight	should	
replicate	the	functionality	of	any	extant	inner	system	(such	as,	using	O’Brien’s	chosen	
model,	that	of	a	connectionist	network),	but	rather	that	it	should	replicate	the	functionality	
of	the	external	notebook	system	(plausibly	that	of	a	classical	database).	Indeed,	Clark	(2008,	
114)	explains	that:	
	
The	parity	probe	was…	meant	to	act	as	a	kind	of	veil	of	metabolic	ignorance,	
inviting	us	to	ask	what	our	attitude	would	be	if	currently	external	means	of	
storage	and	transformation	were,	contrary	to	the	presumed	facts,	found	in	
biology	[my	emphasis].	Thus	understood,	parity	is	not	about	the	outer	
performing	just	like	the	(human-specific)	inner.	
	
But	this	technical	knock-out	against	O’Brien	would	only	have	opened	the	door	to	a	new	
challenge,	one	in	which	the	critic	would	no	doubt	have	pressed	the	point	that	the	fan	of	
first-wave	ExC	still	owes	us	an	account	of	why	we	should	treat	the	notebook-equivalent	
inner	element	as	having	cognitive	status,	that	is,	she	owes	us	an	account	of	the	basis	for	
parity	judgments.	Simply	pointing	to	the	fact	that	the	element	in	question	is	now	inside	the	
head	would	of	course	be	a	profoundly	dubious	response	to	an	entirely	reasonable	request.	
For	one	thing,	it	would	imply	that	the	fan	of	first-wave	ExC	understands	being	inside	the	
head	to	be	sufficient,	although	not	necessary,	for	cognitive	status,	and	while	that’s	not	an	
incoherent	position	to	adopt,	it	certainly	jars	with	the	idea	that	parity	is	‘about	equality	of	
opportunity:	avoiding	a	rush	to	judgment	based	on	spatial	location	alone’	(Clark	2008,	114).	
More	damagingly,	perhaps,	if	simply	being	inside	the	head	is	sufficient	for	an	element	to	
have	cognitive	status,	then	one	could	presumably	apply	the	parity	principle	to	any	old	
external	element	that	shapes	adaptive	behaviour,	no	matter	what	its	functional	
contribution	to	action	or	its	degree	of	integration	with	the	rest	of	the	system,	in	order	to	
deliver	the	conclusion	that	it	has	cognitive	status.	And	that	looks	like	a	recipe	for	what	those	
of	us	in	the	ExC	business	call	‘cognitive	bloat’,	a	to-be-avoided	outcome	in	which	one	is	
forced	to	concede	cases	of	extended	cognition	that	are	wildly	counter-intuitive.		
	
Clark	himself	suggests	that	the	basis	for	parity	judgments	is	the	intuitive	adjudication	of	
common	sense.	As	he	puts	it,	‘the	isomorphism	[what	I	am	calling	‘functional	equivalence’]	
is	said	to	hold	only	in	respect	of	the	explanatory	role	of	the	external	elements	in	a	
commonsense	account	of	the	agent's	behaviour’	(Clark	1998,	98).	And,	in	a	later	treatment:	
the	‘Parity	Principle	was	meant	to	engage	our	rough	sense	of	what	we	might	intuitively	
judge	to	belong	to	the	domain	of	cognition	–	rather	than,	say,	that	of	digestion	–	but	to	do	
so	without	the	pervasive	distractions	of	skin	and	skull’	(Clark	2008,	114).	The	idea,	then,	is	
that	the	inscriptions	in	the	target	notebook	contribute	functionally	to	the	kinds	of	broad	
patterns	of	actual	and	counterfactual	behaviour	(navigating	to,	or	being	disposed	to	
navigate	to,	particular	locations,	and	so	on)	that	everyday	commonsense	psychology	locks	
onto	as	cognition-laden.	That’s	why	the	information	stored	in	the	inscriptions	forms	the	
contents	of	extended	dispositional	beliefs	(believing	where	things	are,	and	so	on),	and	why	
the	notebook	counts	as	part	of	the	relevant	mental	machinery.	In	effect,	then,	O’Brien	
appeals	to	cognitive	science	to	ground	parity	(to	fix	the	conditions	for	functional	
equivalence),	and	satisfies	himself	that	he	has	an	objection	to	ExC,	whereas	Clark	appeals	to	
folk	psychology	to	do	the	same	job,	and	satisfies	himself	that	he	has	an	argument	for,	or	at	
least	has	made	adequate	conceptual	space	for,	ExC.		
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So,	does	Clark’s	strategy	work?	I	think	we	should	be	sceptical,	on	the	grounds	that	our	
contemporary	pre-theoretical	understanding	of	the	domain	of	the	psychological	plausibly	
includes	a	presumption	of	the	within-the-skull-and-skin	internality	of	cognition.	This	is	a	
claim	that	requires	more	in	the	way	of	a	defence	than	I	can	give	it	here	(for	such	a	defence,	
see	Wheeler	2011b).	In	lieu,	however,	here	is	a	quick	and	dirty	example	that	provides	a	
partial	motivation.	Imagine	that	Darwin	were	alive	today.	If	a	radical	creationist	cell	stole	
the	notebook	in	which	he	sketched	the	tree	of	life	and	added	his	famous	comment	‘I	think’2,	
the	folk	might	well	be	interested	in	that	act,	and	either	supportive	of	it	or	appalled	by	it.	But	
whatever	attitudes	the	folk	may	adopt	here,	what’s	driving	their	thinking	is	not	an	interest	
in	the	whereabouts	of	part	of	Darwin’s	cognitive	machinery.	A	plausible	explanation	for	why	
the	folk’s	attitudes	here	aren’t	driven	by	such	an	interest,	but	rather	by	whatever	views	they	
happen	to	hold	about	creation	and	the	idea	of	a	last	universal	common	ancestor,	is	that	
modern	commonsense	psychology	takes	Darwin’s	mind	to	be	realized	wholly	inside	
Darwin’s	head,	so,	by	appeal	to	the	authority	of	commonsense,	the	whereabouts	of	the	
beyond-the-skin	notebook	cannot	coincide	with	the	whereabouts	of	part	of	Darwin’s	
cognitive	machinery.	Putting	the	point	another	way,	if	Darwin’s	notebook	provides	a	case	of	
cognitive	extension,	then,	pace	Clark,	we	will	need	to	call	on	something	other	than	our	
intuitive	understanding	of	the	cognitive	to	explain	why.		
	
It’s	an	intriguing	fact	about	Clark’s	reply	to	O’Brien	that,	having	lodged	the	idea	that	
functional	equivalence	should	be	understood	by	way	of	commonsense	psychology	(an	idea	
that,	as	we	have	seen,	he	pursues	in	later	work),	Clark	promptly	drops	it,	on	the	(as	far	as	I	
can	tell,	unexplained)	grounds	that,	in	his	view,	it	‘only	gets	us	so	far’	(Clark,	1998,	99).	He	
continues:	‘[a]	better	response	to	O'Brien's	critique	is…	to	see	it	as	identifying	a	potential	
tension	between	two	components	of	the	extended	mind	story	itself’	(ibid.,	99).	Those	two	
components	are	functional	equivalence	(i.e.	parity)	and	complementarity,	so	the	potential	
tension	that	Clark	identifies	is	between	arguments	for	ExC	based	on	parity	and	those	based	
on	complementarity.	It	is	at	this	moment,	then,	that	Clark	establishes,	within	his	own	work,	
the	conceptual	basis	for	the	subsequently	drawn	distinction	between	first-wave	and	second-
wave	ExC.		Moreover,	and	perhaps	surprisingly,	Clark	explicitly	gives	priority	to	second-wave	
arguments.	He	writes:	
	
…it	is	best	to	see	functional	isomorphism	as	at	most	part	of	a	sufficient	condition	
for	cognitive	extension,	rather	than	as	a	necessary	feature.	The	more	interesting	
and	plausible	argument	[my	emphasis],	I	feel,	is	the	one	which	describes	the	
seepage	of	mind	into	the	world	by	stressing	that	“the	brain's	brief	is	to	provide	
complementary	facilities	that	will	support	the	repeated	exploitation	of	
operations	upon	the	world	[and]	to	provide	computational	processes	(such	as	
powerful	pattern	completion)	that	the	world,	even	as	manipulated	by	us,	does	
not	usually	afford".	(Embedded	quotation	from	Clark	1997,	68)	
	
For	Clark,	then,	functional	equivalence	is	not	necessary	for	extended	cognition.	But	now	
notice	that	an	absence	of	functional	equivalence,	as	it	relates	to	this	claim,	cannot	be	
																																																						
2	See	http://darwin-online.org.uk/EditorialIntroductions/vanWyhe_notebooks.html,	last	accessed	25	
May	2017.	
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expressed	as	a	failure	of	parity,	if	we	adopt	the	correct	understanding	of	the	parity	principle.	
After	all,	it	is	an	assumption	of	the	parity-based	argument	that	the	target	distributed	system	
with	which	we	begin	and	the	hypothetical	wholly	inner	system	that	we	imagine	are	
functionally	equivalent.	The	question	that	the	parity	principle	helps	us	answer	is	not	
whether	the	two	systems	are	functionally	equivalent,	but	rather	whether	the	two	
functionally	equivalent	systems	are	both	cognitive	or	both	non-cognitive.	If	the	two	systems	
are	not	functionally	equivalent,	one	doesn’t	have	a	failure	of	parity;	one	simply	hasn’t	set	
things	up	properly.	So	the	only	way	to	make	sense	of	Clark’s	claim	that	functional	
equivalence	is	not	necessary	for	extended	cognition	is	in	O’Brien’s	terms,	that	is,	in	terms	of	
a	failure	of	parity	between	(a)	the	functional	contributions	of	certain	external	elements	to	
some	psychologically	interesting	behaviour	and	(b)	the	functional	contributions	of	certain	
extant	inner	elements	to	broadly	similar	behaviour	(e.g.	an	external	classical	database	
versus	a	neurally	realized	inner	connectionist	network).		
	
With	that	thought	in	hand,	one	can	ask	the	million-dollar	question:	is	there	a	good	argument	
for	extended	cognition	that	is	driven	not	by	functional	equivalence,	but	by	
complementarity?	My	own	view	is	that	the	answer	is	‘no’.	To	see	why,	we	need	to	reflect	on	
the	fact	that,	according	to	the	second-waver,	it	is	precisely	the	differences	between	certain	
internal	and	certain	external	elements	that	explain	how	many	cognitive	tasks	are	
performed.	For	example,	following	Bechtel	(1994,	1996),	one	might	explain	how	some	
examples	of	linguistic	behaviour,	natural	deduction	and	mathematical	reasoning	are	
accomplished,	by	citing	a	complementary	combination	of	externally	located	combinatorial	
symbol	systems	and	internally	located	pattern-sensitive	connectionist	networks,	where	the	
latter	do	not	themselves	realize	combinatorial	structure.	In	such	an	arrangement,	the	
capacity	of	connectionist	networks	to	recognize,	and	to	generalize	from,	patterns	in	training	
data,	plus	the	temporal	constraints	that	characterize	real	embodied	engagements	with	
strings	of	external	symbols	(e.g.	different	parts	of	the	input	will	be	available	to	the	network	
at	different	times,	due	to	the	restrictions	imposed	by	temporal	processing	windows)	are	
harnessed	to	allow	those	networks	to	be	appropriately	sensitive	to	the	structural	properties	
of	the	external	symbol	systems.	Adding	in	some	integrationist-friendly	features,	one	might	
even	highlight	the	fact	that	the	skilled	embodied	manipulation	of	the	external	symbols	will	
proceed	according	to	learned	normative	rules	that,	when	mastered,	transform	what	we	can	
do.		
	
As	far	as	I	can	see,	there	is	nothing	to	point	to	in	the	undoubtedly	important	phenomenon	
of	complementarity,	even	when	developed	in	terms	of	integration,	that	mandates	ExC.	Or	at	
least	there	isn’t,	as	long	as	one	accepts	(what	I	take	to	be)	the	pretty	much	unassailable	
thought	that	vehicle	internalism	(the	view	that	the	machinery	of	mind	is	always	entirely	
inside	the	head)	constitutes	the	default	position	in	cognitive	science	(due	to	its	status	as	the	
orthodox	view	in	the	field	with	a	well-documented	history	of	empirical	success),	and	
therefore	that	one	should	give	up	vehicle	internalism	only	when	it	can	no	longer	be	
reasonably	maintained	in	the	face	of	(perhaps	some	combination	of)	unaccounted-for	data,	
differential	explanatory	power,	or	cogent	philosophical	argument.	If	that	is	indeed	right,	
then	the	second-wave	emphasis	on	the	existence	of	theoretically	significant	differences	
between	the	internal	and	the	external	elements	in	question	means	that	complementarity	
fails	to	deliver	ExC,	because	a	vehicle	internalist	reading	of	the	brain-body-world	systems	in	
question,	according	to	which	the	performance	of	inner	cognitive	mechanisms	is	causally	
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scaffolded	by	non-cognitive	external	elements,	remains	eminently	available.	As	Rowlands	
(2010,	90)	puts	it	at	the	culmination	of	a	related	line	of	reasoning,	‘given	that	there	are	
significant	differences	between	internal	cognitive	processes	and	external	processes	involved	
in	cognition,	why	not	simply	suppose	that	the	latter	are	part	of	the	extraneous	scaffolding	in	
which	the	real,	internal	cognitive	processes	are	embedded?’.3	If	one	looks	at	the	Bechtelian	
systems	described	above	through	this	lens,	then	the	internally	located	pattern-sensitive	
connectionist	networks	are	the	genuinely	cognitive	machinery,	whereas	the	externally	
located	combinatorial	symbol	systems	are	‘merely’	performance-boosting,	but	non-
cognitive,	environmental	props	and	scaffolds.	This	is	precisely	the	reading	to	which,	one	
assumes,	O’Brien	would	be	tempted,	and	that	Bechtel	himself	seems	to	favour	(see	e.g.	
Bechtel	1994,	36;	for	discussion,	see	Wheeler	2011b).		
	
The	Bechtelian	combination	of	inner	connectionist	networks	and	external	symbol	systems	
will	figure	again	later	in	our	discussion.	For	the	moment,	let’s	return	to	Clark’s	analysis	of	
parity	and	complementarity.	Clark’s	next	move	is	to	attempt	to	fuse	these	two	elements	
into	a	single,	integrated	picture	of	extended	cognition.	He	writes:		
	
The	argument	for	the	extended	mind	thus	turns	primarily	on	the	way	disparate	
inner	and	outer	components	may	co-operate	so	as	to	yield	integrated	larger	
systems	capable	of	supporting	various	(often	quite	advanced)	forms	of	adaptive	
success.	The	external	factors	and	operations,	in	this	model,	are	most	unlikely	to	
be	computationally	identical	to	the	ones	supported	directly	in	the	wetware	–	
indeed,	the	power	of	the	larger	system	depends	very	much	on	the	new	kinds	of	
storage,	retrieval	and	transformation	made	possible	by	the	use	of	extra-neural	
resources…	These	new	operations,	however,	may	often	be	seen	as	performing	
kinds	of	tasks	which,	were	they	but	done	in	the	head,	we	would	have	no	
hesitation	in	labelling	cognitive.	This	is	because	they	contribute	to	behavioural	
success	by	for	example	storing	and	manipulating	information,	and	by	
reconfiguring	problem	spaces.	This	kind	of	higher-level	functional	isomorphism	
is,	I	think,	quite	compatible	with	the	idea…	that	there	exist	deep	and	important	
differences	between	e.g.,	active	biological	and	passive	symbolic	modes	of	
storage	and	retrieval.	
	
There	are	really	two	different	questions	being	addressed	here.	The	first	is:	as	phenomena,	
are	functional	equivalence	and	complementarity	compatible	with	each	other?	The	answer	
to	this	question	is	surely	‘yes’.		As	Clark	observes,	inner	and	outer	resources	may	be	
functionally	different	when	judged	against	one	standard	(e.g.	the	precise	computational	
operations	performed),	but	functionally	equivalent	when	judged	against	another	(e.g.	a	
general	capacity	for	storing	and	manipulating	information).	Of	course,	given	what	we	have	
learned	about	Clark’s	understanding	of	the	basis	for	parity,	the	fact	that	he	introduces	the	
parity	principle	into	this	passage	indicates	that,	for	him,	the	standard	for	functional	
equivalence	is	ultimately	set	by	the	way	in	which	the	commonsense	adjudications	of	folk	
																																																						
3	Although	Rowlands’	(1999)	earlier	work	is	rightly	identified	as	one	important	source	for	
integrationism,	and	thus	as	one	wellspring	of	second-wave	ExC,	his	more	recent	position	(e.g.	
Rowlands	2010)	has	seen	him	argue	that	parity	considerations	(properly	understood)	and	
complementarity-integrationist	thinking	have	equal	weight	in	the	justification	for	cognitive	
extension.		
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psychology	patrol	the	cognitive/non-cognitive	boundary.	So	the	idea	is	that	the	category	of	
the	cognitive,	as	implicitly	understood	by	the	folk,	is	coarse-grained	enough	to	paper	over	
the	fine-grained	differences	between	inner	and	outer	computational	operations.	
	
The	second	question	in	play	in	the	target	passage,	perhaps	in	a	more	subterranean	register,	
is	this:	does	recognizing	the	peaceful	co-existence	of	complementarity	and	Clark-style	
functional	equivalence	deliver	extended	cognition?	Here,	I	think,	the	answer	must	be	‘no’.	
As	argued	above,	neither	commonsense-driven	parity	nor	an	argument	driven	solely	by	
complementarity	can	deliver	extended	cognition	on	its	own:	the	internalist	bias	of	
contemporary	folk	psychology	makes	it	an	inappropriate	source	for	an	ExC-compliant	
standard	of	functional	equivalence,	and	complementarity	considerations	fail	to	destabilize	
vehicle	internalism.	But	might	the	two	sets	of	considerations	when	combined	be	jointly	
sufficient	for	extended	cognition?	That	doesn’t	seem	likely.	If	we	approach	things	from	one	
direction,	the	recognition	of	commonsense-driven	parity	alongside	complementarity	would	
need	to	counteract	the	inability	of	the	latter	to	destabilize	vehicle	internalism.	But	that	
thought	is	undermined	by	the	vehicle-internalist	bias	of	commonsense	psychology.	From	
the	other	direction,	the	recognition	of	complementarity	alongside	commonsense-driven	
parity	would	need	to	counteract	the	vehicle-internalist	bias	of	commonsense	psychology.	
But	that	thought	is	undermined	by	the	result	that	complementarity	is	unable	to	destabilize	
vehicle	internalism.	In	sum,	neither	Clark-style	functional	equivalence	not	complementarity	
produces	a	compelling	argument	for	extended	cognition,	and	neither	does	their	simple	
conjunction.	Where	do	we	go	from	here?		
	
3.	The	Missing	Ingredient	
	
Here	is	a	proposal:	what	a	good	argument	for	extended	cognition	needs	is	a	suitable	
standard	for	functional	equivalence,	one	that	doesn’t	exhibit	the	kind	of	vehicle-internalist	
bias	manifested	by	modern	commonsense	psychology,	but	which	allows	for	the	
phenomenon	of	complementarity	to	exist	at	some	appropriate	level	of	analysis.	Let’s	see	if	
such	a	standard	can	be	found.		
	
The	concept	of	the	mark	of	the	cognitive	is	most	readily	associated	with	those	hardy	critics	
of	ExC,	Adams	and	Aizawa	(e.g.	2008).	However,	the	notion	itself	is	apt	to	contribute	to	pro-
ExC	as	well	as	anti-ExC	arguments.	To	see	why,	we	need	to	bring	out	a	distinction	that	is	
sometimes	obscured	in	the	literature.	In	the	present	vicinity,	there	are	two	ways	of	applying	
the	notion	of	the	mark	of	the	cognitive.	The	first	focusses	on	the	claim	that	some	theoretical	
account	of	what	counts	as	cognitive	is	needed,	in	order	to	determine	where	in	the	physical	
world	our	mental	machinery	is	located.	The	second	focusses	on	what	specific	theoretical	
account	of	the	cognitive	one	ought	to	adopt.	Call	the	first	of	these	the	slot-level	application	
of	the	idea	(there’s	a	slot	that	needs	to	be	filled),	and	the	second	the	filler-level	application	
(what	should	we	put	in	the	slot?).		
	
To	bring	this	distinction	into	better	view,	consider	first	an	example	given	by	Adams	and	
Aizawa	themselves	(Adams	and	Aizawa	2008,	86-7).	Imagine	someone	sincerely	suggesting	
that	there	are	good	reasons	to	believe	that	crystals	are	alive.	Any	genuine	resolution	of	this	
issue	would	surely	turn	on	a	scientifically	informed	account	of	what	it	is	for	an	entity	to	be	
alive.	As	one	might	put	it,	what	is	needed	is	a	mark	of	the	living.	Notice	that,	so	far,	all	we’ve	
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said	is	that	there’s	a	hole	in	our	picture	–	a	slot	that	needs	to	be	filled,	if	we	are	to	decide	
whether	certain	entities,	namely	crystals,	are	alive.	We	haven’t	yet	said	precisely	what	it	is	
for	an	entity	to	be	alive.	Similarly,	in	the	face	of	the	claim	that	our	cognitive	machinery	
extends	beyond	the	skin,	one	might	say,	along	with	Adams	and	Aizawa,	that	what	is	needed	
to	decide	this	issue	is	a	mark	of	the	cognitive	(there’s	a	slot	to	be	filled),	without	saying	
precisely	what	it	is	for	a	systemic	element	to	be	cognitive	(without	filling	that	slot),	and	thus	
without	saying	whether,	in	fact,	ExC	is	true.	At	the	slot	level,	then,	and	using	my	favoured	
formulation	(Wheeler	2010a,	b,	2011a,	b),	a	mark	of	the	cognitive	is	a	scientifically	informed	
account	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	proper	part	of	a	cognitive	system	that,	so	as	not	to	beg	any	
questions,	is	fundamentally	neutral	with	respect	to	where	any	candidate	element	might	
happen	to	be	spatially	located.		
	
The	mark-of-the-cognitive	slot	is	occupied	once	we	have	a	scientifically	informed,	
locationally	neutral	account	of	what	it	is	for	a	systemic	element	to	be	cognitive	in	character.	
That’s	when	a	filler-level	mark	of	the	cognitive	is	in	place.	So,	when	one	says,	correctly,	that,	
for	Adams	and	Aizawa,	the	mark	of	the	cognitive	is	twofold,	in	that,	for	them,	the	cognitive	
is	individuated	by	the	presence	of	(i)	non-derived	representations	and	(ii)	the	specific	kinds	
of	information	processing	mechanisms	identified	by	human	cognitive	psychology,	one	is	
explicating	their	proposal	for	a	filler-level	mark	of	the	cognitive.	This	is	not	the	end	of	the	
working	day,	however.	Further	philosophical	and	scientific	leg-work	will	still	be	required,	in	
order	to	find	out	precisely	where	cognition	(so	conceived)	falls	–	in	the	brain,	in	the	non-
neural	body,	in	the	environment,	or,	as	ExC	predicts	will	sometimes	be	the	case,	in	a	system	
that	extends	across	all	of	these	aspects	of	the	world.	As	Adams	and	Aizawa	put	it,	when	
discussing	their	own	proposal:	‘We	do	not	maintain	that	non-derived	representations	must	
be	found	in	the	head.	That	cognition	involves	non-derived	representations	is	one	empirical	
hypothesis;	that	non-derived	representations	are	to	be	found	in	some	particular	regions	of	
spacetime	is	another’	(Adams	and	Aizawa	2008,	55).	They	conclude,	however,	that	their	
filler-level	mark	of	the	cognitive	ultimately	licenses	vehicle	internalism	(for	critical	
discussion,	see	e.g.	Clark	2008,	89-92).					
	
As	a	slot-level	structure,	the	concept	of	the	mark	of	the	cognitive	has	been	endorsed	by	a	
number	of	pro-ExC	theorists,	including	Rowlands	(2010),	Walter	(2010)	and	Wheeler	(2010a,	
b,	2011a,	b),	as	making	an	indispensable	contribution	to	the	debate	surrounding	extended	
cognition.	I	am	about	to	add	extra	noise	to	that	clamour.	Of	course,	this	endorsement	leaves	
open	the	question	of	whether	a	specific	account	of	the	cognitive	can	be	found	that,	pace	
Adams	and	Aizawa,	can	fill	that	slot	in	an	ExC-compliant	way.	I	shall	have	something	to	say	
about	that	too.			
	
It	might	seem	that	the	mark	of	the	cognitive	(slot-level	application)	is	just	what	we	need,	in	
order	to	plug	the	gaps	that,	if	I	am	right,	have	opened	up	in	Clark’s	argument	for	ExC.	Firstly,	
the	dependence	on	science	and	the	demand	for	locational	neutrality	mean	that	the	mark-
of-the-cognitive	route	avoids	the	worry	about	the	internalist	bias	of	commonsense	
psychology.	Secondly,	if	an	external	element	bears	a	true	mark	of	the	cognitive,	then	any	
differences	between	the	functional	contribution	of	that	element	and	the	functional	
contribution	of	our	extant	neural	resources	(at	some	level	of	description)	will	provide	no	
mandate	for	relegating	that	element	to	the	status	of	non-cognitive	external	scaffolding.	And	
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thirdly,	a	mark	of	the	cognitive	will	supply	a	standard	by	which	judgments	of	parity	may	be	
made.	Game	over.		
	
Clark	disagrees.	He	argues	that	any	attempt	to	argue	for	ExC	on	the	basis	of	a	mark	of	the	
cognitive	is	‘doomed	to	failure	[because]	the	shape	of	any	such	scientific	theory	of	
legitimate	vehicles	will	surely	be	determined,	in	large	part,	by	what	we	take	as	central	
examples	of	real-world	realizers	of	cognitive	processes	in	the	first	place’	(Clark	2011,	452).	
The	suggestion	here	is	that	the	appeal	to	science	in	determining	a	mark	of	the	cognitive	will	
end	up	undermining	any	effective	sense	of	locational	neutrality.	Thus	say	that	cognitive	
science	settles	on	a	fundamentally	unified	account	of	cognition,	in	the	strong	sense	that	all	
psychological	phenomena	embody	some	deep	principle	of	organization.	Clark’s	worry	is	that	
this	account	will	fail	to	deliver	ExC,	because	it	will	be	‘heavily	biased	towards	its	own	origins’	
(ibid.	453).	To	illustrate	this	worry,	Clark	focusses	on	contemporary	predictive	processing	
models	of	cognition	–	models	in	which,	very	roughly	indeed,	the	brain	is	conceived	as	a	
system	of	hierarchically	organized	subsystems,	each	of	which	predicts	its	inputs	and	then	
corrects	for	any	errors	in	those	predictions	in	order	to	minimize	informational	surprise.	
Clark	notes	that	the	predictive	processing	approach	provides	a	unifying	account	of	a	vast	
range	of	psychological	phenomena	such	as	perception,	learning,	inference	and	attention	
(the	list	is	expanding	daily).	At	this	point,	Clark’s	worry	comes	to	the	fore,	and	it	is,	I	think,	
best	expressed	as	a	dilemma:	either	(i)	predictive	processing	is	the	(filler-level)	mark	of	the	
cognitive,	in	which	case	the	fact	that	it	has	been	developed	as	an	account	specifically	of	
neural	activity	will	skew	things	towards	vehicle	internalism,	or	(ii)	the	fact	that	predictive	
processing	has	been	developed	as	an	account	specifically	of	neural	activity	will	mean	that	
we	need	different	intellectual	resources	in	order	to	establish	that	external	elements	count	
as	genuine	parts	of	our	cognitive	machinery.	In	Clark’s	own	terms,	this	is	the	difference	
between	(a)	‘[regarding]	the	neural	kernel,	the	common	neural	mechanisms	for	the	
progressive	reduction	of	prediction	error,	as	limning	the	space	of	the	cognitive’,	or	(b)	
‘allow[ing]	that	genuinely	cognitive	processes	can	also	become	hybridized,	so	that	their	
effective	mechanisms	include	not	just	the	neural	elements	but	span	brain,	body,	and	world’	
(ibid.	454).	In	sum,	the	result	is	either	a	bias	towards	vehicle	internalism	or	a	failure	to	
answer	the	key	question.4		
	
So,	is	it	true	that	a	filler-level	mark	of	the	cognitive	formed	within	the	heartland	of	
internalism	must	inevitably	deliver	us	into	the	jaws	of	Clark’s	dilemma?	I	don’t	think	so.	
Here	I	shall	redeploy	an	example	that	I	have	used	previously	(Wheeler	2011a,	2014,	2015).	
Recall	that	Bechtel	(1994,	1996)	defends	a	view	according	to	which	a	number	of	high-end	
cognitive	achievements	such	as	linguistic	behaviour,	natural	deduction	and	mathematical	
reasoning	are	often	the	result	of	sensorimotor-mediated	causal	interactions	between	
certain	external	representational	systems	(e.g.	logical	and	mathematical	notations)	and	
internal	connectionist	networks,	interactions	in	which	atomic	symbols	are	combined	and	
manipulated	according	to	the	principles	of	an	externally	realized	compositional	syntax	and	
semantics.	As	also	mentioned	earlier,	Bechtel	himself	seems	to	hold	that	the	genuinely	
																																																						
4	This	is	not	to	say,	of	course,	that	predictive	processing	is	necessarily	inconsistent	with	extended	
cognition,	or	that	it	couldn’t	figure	in	an	argument	for	extended	cognition,	but	only	that	predictive	
processing	cannot	figure	in	such	an	argument	by	providing	a	mark	of	the	cognitive.	For	more	on	
predictive	processing	and	ExC,	see	e.g.	(Clark	2017).			
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cognitive	part	of	the	proposed	distributed	solution	here	remains	skin-side.		But	there	is	an	
alternative	view	available.			
	
Newell	and	Simon	(1976,	116)	once	claimed	that	a	suitably	organized	‘physical	symbol	
system	has	the	necessary	and	sufficient	means	for	general	intelligent	action’.		A	physical	
symbol	system	(henceforth	PSS)	is	(roughly)	a	material	system	in	which	atomic	symbols	are	
automatically	combined	and	manipulated	by	structure-sensitive	processes,	according	to	the	
principles	of	a	compositional	syntax	and	semantics.	Although	Newell	and	Simon	adopted	
what	we	might	call	an	unrestricted	form	of	this	hypothesis	(i.e.,	all	cognition	is	the	result	of	
a	suitably	organized	PSS),	one	might	reasonably	adopt	a	more	restricted	version.	For	
example,	let’s	proceed	–	as	many	classical	computational	psychologists	studying	the	human	
mind	manifestly	have	–	by	holding	that	a	suitably	organized	PSS	has	the	sufficient	means	for	
certain	high-end	cognitive	achievements.	There’s	no	doubt	that	Newell	and	Simon	intended	
their	proposal	to	deliver	an	account	of	what	the	brain	does	–	more	precisely,	to	provide	an	
account	of	the	cognition-realizing	computational	processes	that	are	implemented	in	the	
brain.	By	Clark’s	reasoning,	this	ought	to	drive	us	into	the	jaws	of	the	dilemma	highlighted	
above.	But,	I	submit,	it	doesn’t.	Rather,	Bechtel’s	distributed	architecture	of	an	inner	
connectionist	network	coupled	to	an	external	symbol	system	qualifies	as	a	PSS.	Put	more	
carefully,	the	different-but-complementary	inner	and	outer	elements	(the	inner	pattern-
sensitive	connectionist	processes	and	the	outer	symbols	on	which	those	processes	are	
targeted)	together	comprise	a	hybrid,	distributed	realization	of	a	PSS.	So,	given	the	
theoretical	resources	of	a	slot-level	appeal	to	the	need	for	a	mark	of	the	cognitive,	and	a	
filler-level	unpacking	of	that	notion	in	terms	of	our	restricted	PSS	hypothesis,	the	Bechtelian	
architecture	in	question	emerges	not	as	a	hybrid	arrangement	of	cognitive	and	non-
cognitive	elements,	but	as	a	distributed	(over	brain,	body	and	world)	system	in	which	each	
element	counts	as	cognitive.	In	other	words,	if	being	a	PSS	is	a	mark	of	the	cognitive,	then	
our	Bechtelian	architecture	is	not	only	an	extended	PSS,	it	is	also	an	extended	cognitive	
system.		
	
Of	course,	more	would	need	to	be	said	to	drive	home	this	idea.	For	example,	one	would	
have	to	establish	that	some	subset	of,	or	some	combination	of,	inner	connectionist	
structures	and	non-neural	bodily	factors	(where	the	latter	might	include	the	physical	
movements	by	which	the	external	symbols	in	question	are	manipulated)	could	reasonably	
be	interpreted	as	realizing	the	classical-style	rules	of	a	PSS	(for	discussion,	see	Wheeler	
2011a).	But	let’s	assume	that	any	such	concerns	can	be	met.	What	we	have	brought	into	
view	is	a	mark	of	the	cognitive	that	an	area	of	established	human	cognitive	psychology	
(classical	computational	psychology	focussed	ultimately	on	explaining	what	the	brain	does)	
takes	to	be	theoretically	important.	And	yet,	contra	Clark,	that	very	approach	seems	to	
support	ExC,	in	that,	under	the	right	circumstances,	some	of	the	systemic	elements	in	
question	(the	symbol	structures)	may	be	externally	located.		
	
To	be	clear,	I	am	not	claiming	that	the	PSS	hypothesis	is	true.	But	then	I	don’t	need	that	
claim	for	the	point	at	issue.	I	have	sought	to	demonstrate	only	that	a	candidate	mark	of	the	
cognitive	forged	within	the	heartland	of	vehicle	internalism	is	able	to	meet	the	locational	
neutrality	requirement	and	thus	potentially	play	a	pivotal	role	in	the	debate	over	ExC.	Put	
another	way,	and	pace	Clark,	the	fact	that	a	particular	mark	of	the	cognitive	has	been	
	 12	
extracted	from	an	account	designed	to	explain	inner	(neural)	activity	does	not	necessarily	
skew	things	towards	vehicle	internalism	or	leave	ExC	with	a	justificatory	deficit.		
	
4.	Snakes	and	Ladders	
	
Where	Clark	sees	a	snake,	I	see	a	ladder.	For	Clark,	appealing	to	a	mark	of	the	cognitive	
condemns	the	advocate	of	ExC	to	a	relentless	slide	into	a	helpless	oscillation	between	
vehicle	internalism	and	more	work	to	be	done.	By	contrast,	I	have	argued	that	just	such	an	
appeal	furnishes	the	advocate	of	ExC	with	a	sturdy	ladder	that	traverses	the	gaps	left	in	
those	arguments	for	extended	cognition	that	are	based	on	parity,	complementarity,	or	the	
combination	of	the	two.	But	perhaps	‘traverse’	is	the	wrong	word.	Maybe	‘by-pass’	is	better.	
For	it	is	arguable	that	once	we	have	access	to	a	mark	of	the	cognitive,	we	simply	don’t	need	
to	concern	ourselves	with	notions	such	as	parity	and	complementarity.	As	Walter	(2010,	
295)	puts	it,	during	a	discussion	of	the	former,	‘[o]nce	we	have	at	hand	a	mark	of	the	
cognitive,	then	if	some	extended	process	has	it,	it	is	cognitive,	and	if	not,	then	not,	
regardless	of	any	parity	reasoning’.	Something	similar	might	be	said	in	relation	to	
complementarity.	Here,	however,	we	need	to	recall	the	distinction	between	the	arguments	
and	the	phenomena.	As	Clark’s	treatment	of	the	issues	nicely	indicates,	there	seems	little	
doubt	that	functional	equivalence	and	complementarity	(co-existing	when	different	
standards	for	functional	equivalence	are	utilized)	are	phenomena	that	will	figure	in	
extended	cognitive	systems,	if	any	such	systems	exist,	so	these	notions	will	continue	to	play	
an	important	part	in	our	understanding	of	extended	cognition,	even	if	their	roles	in	the	
argument	for	ExC	have	been	called	into	question.			
	
Given	these	reflections,	perhaps	a	better	description	of	how	things	stand	is	that	the	best	
argument	for	extended	cognition,	the	one	that	relies	centrally	on	the	concept	of	a	mark	of	
the	cognitive,	does	not	fit	comfortably	into	either	wave	of	the	movement	that	was	founded	
in	and	shaped	by	Clark’s	seminal	work.	That	said,	and	given	that	the	mark-of-the-cognitive	
argument	for	extended	cognition	might	reasonably	be	interpreted	as	a	call	for	systems	with	
various	material	instantiations	to	receive	equal	treatment	when	judged	against	a	spatially	
unbiased	and	theoretically	motivated	standard	of	what	counts	as	cognitive,	that	argument	is	
perhaps	most	naturally	seen	as	a	development	of	first-wave	(parity-based),	rather	than	of	
second-wave	(complementarity-based),	thinking.	Issues	of	pigeonholing	aside,	however,	the	
key	conclusion	of	our	investigation	into	parity	and	complementarity	remains	this:	in	spite	of	
Clark’s	arguments	to	the	contrary,	the	hypothesis	of	extended	cognition	needs	a	mark	of	the	
cognitive.			
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